English reading of Wilsonian Impulse, re: German reunification,

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The Wilsonian impulse us foreign policy. The alliance and German unification by Mary N Hampton, read by Mary Anne Hampton chapter six conclusions. I have shown that the US interest in balancing against the Soviet threat explains only a part of the American push to create the Western alliance. Preceding that interest was a Wilsonian view of the world that included an important set of beliefs about how to approach Western security. This set of beliefs and their galvanization upon emergence of the Soviet threat constituted the Wilsonian impulse. The evolution of West West and East West relations was directly influenced by it because the Wilsonian impulse included a set of objectives and assumptions separate from American balancing behavior against the Soviet *****. The Western alliance evolved differently from previous alliances. The alliance evolved as a hybrid between a traditional defense pact that targets an external threat as typical of the realist assessment of alliances and a Wilsonian security community where in the transatlantic community evolved and West Germany reaped great advantage through the Versailles remedial the set of Wilsonian ideas that were legitimated by the history of World War One. And the inner war years confirmed the Wilsonian expectations of key Postwar American foreign policy players and influence directly the policy alternatives they perceived as available to them. West Germany's speedy integration into the Western alliance was an American foreign policy success story because of the ordering principles established for American policymakers by the Wilsonian impulse, the United States was not willing to use coercive power as a hegemon to socialize West Germany into the Western fold. Most important for the integration of West Germany into the West was the set of principles, rules and objectives directed toward building a security community. These were at the heart of the Western security relationship and enabled bond to proceed swiftly with rehabilitation after the war. In fact, the Versailles remedial made certain that West Germany would enter the West on highly advantageous terms. Bond became adept at appealing to the lessons of Versailles and reinforcing the active influence of the Wilsonian impulse participation in the alliance constructed West German foreign policy choices in unique ways. Most important was that Bonn accepted the diffuse reciprocal agreement made by the allies in 1954 wherein they assumed responsibility over the long run for achieving peaceful unification. In 1990 the tumultuous changes in international politics presented bond with the historic moment in which to reunite. While great skepticism and fear existed among its neighbors and allies. Regarding this so-called rush to unity, Cole could and did legitimize his moves through the Allied understanding. In fact, the Bush administrative was supportive, especially its State Department and alluded to the allied Wilsonian bargain struck with West Germany. This study raises important issues regarding how we should think about NATO and its future. First, the dual mission of the alliance must be carefully considered. The resiliency of NATO can only be partly understood in light of its role as a continued insurance policy against Russia or because of its collective defense mission. It is also strongly due to its potential as the nucleus of a broadly stroked collective security community. This community building aspect of the alliance has been highly successful and thus could serve as the model for a transatlantic and Europe wide security community.